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Kenyaa b s t r a c t
Health insurance can improve health-seeking behaviors and protect consumption from health shocks but
may also crowd out informal insurance. This paper therefore examines whether impacts of health insur-
ance depend on households’ access to informal insurance, as proxied for by mobile money usage. Based
on high-frequency financial diaries data collected in rural Kenya, we find that households with weaker
access to informal insurance cope with uninsured health shocks by lowering subsequent non-health
expenditures by approximately 25 percent. These same households are able to smooth consumption
when health shocks are insured, due to lower out-of-pocket health expenditures. In contrast, households
with access to informal insurance are able to smooth consumption even in the absence of formal health
insurance. For this latter group, health insurance increases healthcare utilization at formal clinics and
does not crowd out gifts and remittances during weeks with health shocks. These findings provide guid-
ance for insurance schemes aiming to target the most vulnerable populations.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In low- and middle-income countries, households pay a large
share of health expenditures out of pocket. To cope with these
expenditures, households rely on self-insurance through precau-
tionary savings (Rosenzweig &Wolpin, 1993), adjustments in labor
supply (Kochar, 1995), borrowing and informal credit (Khan, Bedi,
& Sparrow, 2015; Udry, 1994), and informal transfers in the form of
gifts and remittances (De Weerdt & Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps,
1992; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). However, these coping strategies
provide incomplete insurance; several studies have found that
households are unable to fully smooth consumption when house-
hold members fall ill (Gertler & Gruber, 2002; Heltberg & Lund,
2009; Morduch, 1999; Wagstaff, 2007), and that they underutilize
both preventive and curative healthcare (Dupas, 2011).1
In recent years, many countries have started introducing health
insurance for the poor. Health insurance allows households to pre-
pay for healthcare, thereby reducing the share of catastrophichealth expenditures that households need to pay out of pocket.
As such, health insurance potentially improves both consumption
smoothing and health-seeking behavior (Azam, 2018). However,
if informal coping strategies and formal health insurance play sim-
ilar roles in the presence of health shocks, health insurance may
replace informal insurance without generating additional impacts
or may even result in increased medical spending (Wagstaff,
2007). The anticipation of such substitution effects could explain
why many health insurance pilots suffer from relatively low
demand (Acharya et al., 2012).
This study therefore tests whether health insurance impacts
depend on households’ access to informal insurance mechanisms.
To do so, it uses detailed, high-frequency financial diaries data that
provide weekly measures of illnesses, healthcare utilization, out-
of-pocket health expenditures, informal coping strategies and
non-health expenditures. These data were collected over the per-
iod of a full year (2012–2013) among a sample of rural households
in western Kenya. For nearly half of the households, enrollment
status varied over time. We will use this within-household varia-
tion in insurance status in the identification of health insurance
impacts.
We test whether the impact of formal health insurance differs
by mobile money usage. We conjecture that usage of mobile
2 Nandi County had a population of 752,965 in the 2009 National Population and
Housing Census. The area is typical of rural Kenya, with a poverty rate of 47.4 percent,
primary school attainment of approximately 67.3 percent, and secondary school
attainment of only 10.7 percent, according to the Kenya Integrated Household Budget
Survey (KIHBs) 2016/2017. With only 13.6 percent of Nandi County’s population
living in urban areas, agriculture—including dairy farming—forms the main economic
activity in the area.
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participants using mobile money received more money from
friends and family and withdrew more savings than non-users of
mobile money. User households’ income from informal transfers
and buffer stock sales increased during periods of uninsured health
shocks, which we do not observe for non-users of mobile money,
suggesting that mobile money users have better access to informal
strategies to cope with risk. We cannot attribute this improved
ability to cope with risk to the mobile money technology itself.
Instead, we hypothesize that households with greater access to
informal coping mechanisms select into using mobile money.
We analyze the effects of health insurance using a household
fixed-effects model. Building on time variation in insurance status
within households, we test whether the same household copes dif-
ferently with illness or injury depending on whether the household
has insurance coverage at the time of the shock. We find that
health insurance has two distinct effects. First, among non-users
of mobile money, who appear to have weaker access to informal
insurance, health shocks decrease food expenditures in subsequent
weeks, but only during uninsured periods. Insurance coverage
reduces out-of-pocket health expenditures, providing an explana-
tion for why insured households are better able to smooth con-
sumption. Second, among mobile money users, who withdraw
more savings and receive more informal transfers during weeks
with uninsured health shocks, health shocks do not affect food
expenditures. Health insurance, however, does not crowd out
informal insurance, and it increases the utilization of clinics while
also lowering out-of-pocket expenditures in these clinics. Thus, by
shifting patients from the informal health sector to formal clinics,
insurance complements the informal insurance mechanisms that
help mobile money users cope with health shocks.
This paper relates to the existing literature in several ways.
First, it adds to the literature on health insurance impacts in low-
and middle-income countries. Past research shows that health
insurance can improve health-seeking behavior, provide financial
protection from health shocks by reducing catastrophic health
expenditures, and in some cases improve non-medical consump-
tion (Fink, Robyn, Sié, & Sauerborn, 2013; Hamid, Roberts, &
Mosley, 2011; Miller, Pinto, & Vera-Hernández, 2013; Wagstaff &
Pradhan, 2005), although other studies do not find impacts
(Acharya et al., 2012; Dhanaraj, 2016; Karan, Yip, & Mahal,
2017). These studies mainly rely on low-frequency data, collected
over a period of at least one to two years. We use high-frequency
data instead, which can help improve the power to detect impacts,
especially for dependent variables with low autocorrelation
(McKenzie, 2012). Further, given that longer recall periods are
associated with underreporting of morbidity, doctor visits, and
sickness absenteeism (Das, Hammer, & Sánchez-Paramo, 2012),
shorter recall periods (in our case of only a week) can improve
impact estimates. Our data also include mild illnesses and injuries
that could easily be forgotten in a survey three months later, but
that account for more than one-third of all health shocks.
Second, the paper relates to the literature on linkages between
formal insurance and informal insurance. To date, this literature
has mainly focused on how informal insurance can crowd out
the demand for formal insurance. Using observational data,
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (1007) showed that informal risk-
sharing in caste groups reduces demand for formal weather insur-
ance. Informal transfers may discourage individuals from purchas-
ing optimal levels of formal health insurance coverage (Jowett,
2003), in part because they can rely on contributions from insured
peers when they fall ill (Janssens & Kramer, 2016). Studies on
whether health insurance crowds out informal insurance are rare.
However, social security, pensions, and food aid have been shown
to crowd out private transfers, thus reducing program impacts
(Cox & Jimenez, 1992; Dercon & Krishnan, 2003; Jensen, 2004),and Strupat and Klohn (2018) find crowding out of informal trans-
fers related to the implementation of a national health insurance
scheme in Ghana. We do not replicate this finding, neither for
informal transfers nor for other informal coping mechanisms.
Third, the paper links to the literature on mobile money. Mobile
money can improve welfare in general, and health financing more
specifically, by reducing the cost of sending and receiving transfers
(Jack & Suri, 2014; Munyegera & Matsumoto, 2016) and by allow-
ing recipients to spend transfers differently than people who
receive transfers manually (Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, &
Tierney, 2016). Unlike Jack and Suri (2014), we cannot attribute
improved risk-coping to the existence of mobile money technol-
ogy. Instead, we test whether health insurance has different
impacts depending on whether households use mobile money,
hypothesizing that households with better access to informal
insurance select into using mobile money. Although we indeed find
impact heterogeneity, our findings suggest that insurance can have
positive impacts even for households with a greater ability to
finance their medical bills.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next
section describes the intervention and identification strategy.
Section 3 presents more details on data collection and the main
variables of interest and validates mobile money usage as a proxy
for access to informal insurance. The econometric results are pre-
sented in Section 4. The final section discusses the implications
of these findings for the design and targeting of health insurance
and mobile health financing products.2. Methods
2.1. Context
The study uses data collected among a sample of dairy farmers
from Nandi County, a predominantly rural area in western Kenya
characterized by poor access to affordable, quality healthcare.2 At
the time of the study, Kenya’s national health insurance scheme,
the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), covered inpatient care
in public hospitals but not health expenditures in private facilities or
expenditures for outpatient care. Moreover, enrollment in NHIF
among informal sector workers was very low. Hence, despite the
existence of the NHIF, the average household (often uninsured) still
paid 38.7 percent of total health expenditures out of pocket (Kenya
National Health Accounts, 2012/2013).
In the absence of formal health insurance coverage, households
may have developed alternative risk-coping strategies, including
the use of informal credit, transfers, and savings; in our context,
savings include both cash savings and in-kind buffer stock savings
in the form of small livestock and maize kept in storage. In addi-
tion, urban-rural remittances appear to play an important role in
health financing in eastern Africa. De and Hirvonen (2016), for
instance, found a reduction in Tanzanian migrants’ consumption
in years after their extended family at home experienced negative
shocks such as a serious illness, suggesting that these migrants
were sending money home to help their family pay medical bills.
When households receive informal transfers to cope with health
shocks, there is less scope for health insurance to provide financial
protection from catastrophic health expenditures and to improve
health-seeking behavior.
3 The premium was deducted from the monthly milk payment before deductions
for other services from Tanykina, including veterinary services, agricultural inputs, or
cash advances. Hence, only milk production, milk prices, and the quantity of milk sold
could influence farmers’ ability to pay the premium through their milk accounts.
4 KSh: Kenya shilling. The value of KSh 1000 was approximately US$11.50 at the
time of data collection.
5 At this time, TCHP also opened up to the general population, including
households that were not members of Tanykina. Because TCHP was available only
to members of Tanykina at the study design phase, data collection was limited to
Tanykina members and their households.
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tated by the rapid expansion of mobile money. Introduced first
through a product known as M-Pesa, this relatively cheap and con-
venient technology provides financial inclusion to households
without access to formal banking services. In 2014, 58 percent of
adults in Kenya had a mobile money account; by the end of
2015, the M-Pesa service had more than 20 million registered cus-
tomers and a network of about 85,756 agents. Mobile money is
also expanding in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with
roughly 12 percent of adults in the region having a mobile money
account in 2014 (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, & Van
Oudheusden, 2015). This expansion of mobile money has provided
households with consumption insurance for health- and weather-
related shocks (Jack & Suri, 2014).
Although health insurance will not add value in such a context if
it merely substitutes for remittances, there is scope for positive
impacts if informal insurance is incomplete. Informal insurance
could be incomplete, for instance, because migrants do not want
to send money unconditionally; evidence of extensive monitoring
by remitting household members suggests that this is indeed the
case (De Laat, 2014). Rather, before remitting, migrants invest con-
siderable resources into information acquisition; to validate, for
instance, whether indeed there is a health shock in the household
back home. In reducing the need for informal assistance, health
insurancemay also reduce suchmonitoring costs. As such, crowding
out of informal insurance is not necessarily an undesirable outcome.
2.2. Intervention
To improve the quality and affordability of healthcare in Nandi
County, the PharmAccess Foundation—a nongovernmental organi-
zation with the mission to strengthen health markets in Africa—de-
veloped the Tanykina Community Health Plan (TCHP). This
insurance scheme was implemented in partnership with the Ken-
yan insurance company AAR and the Tanykina Dairy Plant Ltd., a
farmer-owned dairy organization in Nandi County. Financially sup-
ported by the Health Insurance Fund, the TCHP was launched in
2011 for all Tanykina members and was later rebranded as The
Community Health Plan for members of other dairy organizations,
as well as for the general public residing in program locations. At
the onset of the study, TCHP was available only to farmers who
supplied their milk to Tanykina. The program intended to improve
access to primary and secondary healthcare, in both public and pri-
vate health facilities, by crowding in private prepaid health financ-
ing through nonsubsidized insurance premiums.
TCHP includes interventions targeting both supply and demand
in healthcare markets. On the one hand, TCHP introduces health
insurance, allowing households to prepay for quality healthcare.
Families enrolling in TCHP are able to use covered healthcare ser-
vices free of charge, without out-of-pocket payments for health-
care services, in facilities that are part of the insurance network.
To alleviate liquidity constraints, TCHP collected insurance premi-
ums, and renewed insurance coverage, on a monthly basis.
The scheme also aims to improve the quality of healthcare in
facilities within its network by implementing quality standards,
financing initial facility upgrades, and regularly monitoring quality
improvements. In the absence of such quality-enhancing interven-
tions, health insurance schemes may have lower impacts
(Thornton et al., 2010; Zhang, Nikoloski, & Mossialos, 2017), and
without quality monitoring, adverse provider incentives can even
lead to negative health impacts (Fink et al., 2013). Because TCHP
is a cashless system, it potentially also has stronger impacts on
alleviating short-term cash constraints to seek health care com-
pared with a reimbursements-based scheme.
Our analyses use two sources of variation in a household’s
monthly insurance status. First, Tanykina deducted the premiumfrom enrolled families’ monthly milk payments. If milk payments
were insufficient to pay the insurance premium (for instance, if
the household did not deliver enough milk throughout the month),
the household needed to pay the premium in another way, such as
in cash; otherwise, the household would be suspended from
receiving free TCHP healthcare services for one month.3 If a house-
hold did not pay the premium for two months in a row, that house-
hold was dropped from the insurance scheme and would not be
allowed to re-enter for a period of 12 months. This design created
variation in insurance status within households over time.
Second, several households dropped out of the scheme follow-
ing a redesign of the insurance program. At the onset of the study,
the benefit package included both outpatient and inpatient cover-
age (the ‘‘comprehensive package”), including the treatment of
chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and
hypertension. The premium, which was at actuarially fair rates
with marketing and administrative costs being fully subsidized,
depended on the size of the household. In April 2013, halfway
through the study, TCHP introduced an additional, cheaper pack-
age, which consisted of outpatient care only (the ‘‘basic package”);
in addition, all premiums became fixed, irrespective of household
size. The basic and comprehensive packages were priced at an
actuarially fair KSh 300 and KSh 1100 per month per family,
respectively.4 After this redesign, all households were approached
to select one of the two packages, and those who did not actively
select a package were dropped from the plan.5 In our sample, 31.7
percent of insured households decided not to renew their insurance
policy at this time. Among renewing households, 24.2 percent opted
for the basic package and the remaining 75.8 percent kept the com-
prehensive package.2.3. Econometric strategy
Wewill estimate the effects of health shocks and insurance cov-
erage on healthcare utilization, health expenditures, non-health
expenditures, and informal insurance mechanisms. Our first
hypothesis is that households with weaker access to informal
insurance are unable to protect non-health expenditures from
health shocks. For these households, health insurance provides
financial protection from large out-of-pocket medical costs, reduc-
ing the negative impacts of health shocks on non-health expendi-
tures. In addition, to the extent that financial constraints prevent
households from seeking healthcare, health insurance can improve
health-seeking behavior.
We also hypothesize that households with stronger access to
informal insurance are able to protect their non-health expendi-
tures from health shocks, even in the absence of formal insurance
coverage. For these households, health insurance—which reduces
out-of-pocket health expenditures—could potentially crowd out
informal coping strategies. If insurance provided through these
informal mechanisms is sufficiently strong, we would not expect
health insurance to have an additional effect on healthcare utiliza-
tion or on consumption smoothing.
We will use high-detail weekly panel data on health and
finances collected among TCHP target groups to test these
hypotheses, using the following equation for household i in week t:
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
þInsureditcL
þMoreAccessi  Uninsuredit  ShockitbM1

þInsuredit  ShockitbM2 þ InsureditcM
þ ai þ lt þ eit; ð1Þ
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest, Shockit is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the household experiences a health shock in
week t, Uninsuredit and Insuredit are dummy variables indicating
whether a household is (formally) uninsured or insured in week t,
respectively, LessAccessi and MoreAccessi are two dummy variables
to indicate households with less (‘L’) versus more (‘M’) access to
informal insurance, and b j1 and b
j
2—estimated separately for the
two household types j 2 fL;Mg—represent the effect of health
shocks during weeks without and with insurance coverage and
are hence our main coefficients of interest. We include a household
fixed effect, ai, to control for time-invariant household characteris-
tics and a week fixed effect, lt , to reflect time-varying changes that
are common across households. Finally, eit is a regular (time-
varying) error term that we assume is clustered at the household
level.
This specification allows us to pool all observations and control
for time fixed effects, while estimating the coefficients of interest
for four subsamples simultaneously (households with less versus
more access to social support and households with versus without
formal insurance), and testing for significant differences in these
coefficients. In this equation, bL1 and b
L
2 capture the effect of health
shocks for households with less access to informal insurance during
weeks that they are formally uninsured and insured, respectively;
while bM1 and b
M
2 capture the effect of health shocks for households
with more access to informal insurance during weeks that they are
formally uninsured and insured, respectively.
We will apply inverse hyperbolic sine transformations to all
income and expenditure variables.6 Similar to logarithmic transfor-
mations, coefficients of our transformed variables can be interpreted
as a percentage change.
2.4. Identification
The difference between the parameter estimates b̂ j1 and b̂
j
2
quantifies the effect of health insurance on households’ response
to health shocks. The estimated effect will be consistent only if,
conditional on other covariates, the error term, eit , is uncorrelated
with the interaction of Shockit and Insuredit . Three possible sources
of omitted variable bias could violate this condition: bias due to
seasonality confounds, time-varying household characteristics, or
unobserved time-invariant household-level confounds. Our empir-
ical strategy addresses each of these sources of bias as follows.
First, the probability of experiencing health shocks or (re-)
enrolling in insurance may vary over time due to seasonal charac-
teristics that also have a direct effect on our outcome variables of
interest. Consider as an example the rainy season versus the dry
season. In the rainy season, household members are more likely
to contract infectious diseases; economic activity is also higher in
this period.7 Increased economic activity allows households to make
more money and pay their insurance premiums but also to spend6 Without this transformation, the distribution of these variables would be skewed
to the right, violating the assumption of normality of our error term (and, in models
whereby we control for such variables, introducing the potential of bias due to outlier
values). Except for very small values of y, the inverse hyperbolic sine of y is
approximately equal to logð2Þ þ logðyÞ, meaning that it can be interpreted in the same
way as a logarithmic variable; however, the advantage of the inverse hyperbolic sine
is that it is defined also when a variable takes on a value of zero.
7 Malaria is a good example of a disease that is more prevalent during the rainy
season when economic activity is higher. The study region is, however, at a
sufficiently high altitude for malaria not to be endemic to the region. Very few health
symptoms reported in the diaries study are indeed related to malaria.more on non-health-related goods and services. In order to control
for such seasonality, the model includes week fixed effects. To the
extent that seasonality is common to all households, this approach
will control for such time trends. Household-specific seasonality is
controlled for through the weekly insurance status variable
ðInsureditÞ without health shock interaction.
Second, the estimated effect of health insurance at the time of a
health shock is potentially confounded by time-varying household
characteristics. One concern could be that households enroll in
health insurance when they experience a relatively severe health
shock. In that case, the interaction of health insurance and shocks
could capture the severity of the shock, as opposed to insurance
coverage for the related health expenditures. TCHP maintained a
waiting period of 5 to 35 days between the sign-up date and the
policy start date. Specifically, households registering between the
1st and 25th of the month were covered from the first of the next
month, but those registering after the 25th had to wait one more
month for their coverage to start. Thus, we do not expect enroll-
ment due to illness to be a major concern. Section A.7 in the Online
Supplement further shows that health shocks and other potential
time-variant confounds including milk production, income and
non-health expenditures do not affect subsequent insurance
enrollment and drop-out decisions, and our results are robust to
the inclusion of these variables as controls.
Third, health shocks and insurance coverage may be correlated
with unobserved household characteristics that have a direct effect
on our outcome variables themselves. For instance, it is plausible
that wealthier households are more likely to have insurance cover-
age but are also more likely to go to better facilities, at which they
spend more per visit, when someone in the household falls ill. Also,
households with worse health, whose condition may force them to
spend more per health visit, might be more likely to enroll in
health insurance; similarly, households with larger social networks
may choose not to purchase insurance because they can use infor-
mal insurance to cope with health shocks. If unobserved, these
characteristics could bias the estimated effect of formal insurance.
However, to the extent that unobserved variables are time invari-
ant, the inclusion of household fixed effects corrects for this bias.
Intuitively, by comparing the effect of insured and uninsured
health shocks for the same household, we can identify the effect
of insurance coverage, controlling for the average effect of health
shocks in that household.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data collection, attrition and non-response
To test whether health insurance provides consumption insur-
ance against health shocks and improves health-seeking behavior,
we use high-frequency data collected as part of the Health and
Financial Diaries project (Janssens, Kramer, Van der List, & Pap,
2013) (henceforth referred to as ‘‘the diaries”). Data collection took
place between October 2012 and October 2013, before mobile
money usage in Kenya was near-universal. The aim of the diaries
was to enhance understanding of the health-seeking behavior
and financial lives of households targeted by TCHP; data collection
was funded by the PharmAccess Foundation.
Three Tanykina dairy collection areas were selected to imple-
ment the diaries. These collection areas were close enough to a
clinic that distance would not be a major barrier to using health-
care or to enrolling in TCHP. From these three collection areas,
we randomly selected seven villages with a minimum of 25 Tanyk-
ina member households each; from these seven villages, we sam-
pled a total of 120 households with 184 respondents and 564
household members. Sampling was proportional to the total
number of Tanykina members in the seven study villages and
Table 1
Sample size, attrition and non-response.
Number Percentage
(1) (2)





Respondents per household 1.5 68.9y
Panel B. Attrition
Households dropping out 2 1.67




At least one respondent interviewed 5747 93.2
– At least one but not all respondents interviewed 950 15.4
– All respondents interviewed 4797 77.8
No respondents interviewed 422 6.8
Note: Data from the Health and Financial Diaries project (Janssens et al., 2013). All
financially active adults were interviewed weekly for 55 weeks, except for three
weeks in which interviewing was not possible due to major holidays or elections,
and for two households that dropped out before the end of the study (for whom
combined the data include in total 33 interviews).
y = as a percentage of adults.
11
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around 50 percent of households being insured.8
Table 1 Panel A provides information regarding sample size. The
diaries included weekly interviews with 120 households for the
duration of a full year. Before the onset of the weekly interviews,
all households completed a baseline survey.Then, each week, at
least one respondent in the household provided household-level
information on agricultural production and consumption of self-
produced foods, shocks to household wealth, illnesses and injuries,
and health-seeking behavior. The health module on illnesses, inju-
ries, and health-seeking behavior covered all household members,
including children, adult respondents, and financially inactive
adults. The module probed for all health symptoms, both major
and minor, collecting details such as symptoms and the number
of days that the ill or injured household member was unable to
carry out his or her daily activities, as well as any healthcare uti-
lization (including provider choice, out-of-pocket expenditures,
and types of services received).
All economically active adults in a household, both male and
female, or 68.9 percent of adults, were interviewed separately
and in private.9 They provided not only the household-level details
described above but also detailed information on all their individual
financial flows in the seven days preceding each interview, including
all cash in- and outflows (for instance, income, expenditures, gifts,
and savings) from their financial tools (such as cash, bank accounts,
mobile money, and saving groups). It is important to note here that
our goal was to document households’ financial transactions; the
diaries were not designed to estimate the total value of household
consumption as an income or living standards measure.108 Sampling of insured (uninsured) households within each village was proportional
to the number of insured (uninsured) households in a village relative to the total
number of insured (uninsured) households in the seven sampled villages.
9 The remaining 31.1 percent of adults included students dependent on their
parents, disabled people, and the elderly.
10 There could, for instance, be differences between households regarding whether
they own or rent their house. When owning a house, expenditures observed in the
diaries will be lower because for these households, there are no monthly cash
outflows for rent. We are unable to include costs of such capital items and focus
instead on the impacts on financial behaviors (observed with high frequency) rather
than longer term living standards (which would be more appropriate to look at in
longitudinal studies with longer recall periods spanning multiple years).Panel B summarizes attrition at the household and respondent
levels. Only two complete households (1.7 percent) dropped out
of the sample during the course of the study, and only eight
respondents dropped out while their households continued partic-
ipating in the study.11 These respondents are included in the analy-
sis up to the week in which they drop out.12 Panel C describes non-
response among the 120 households. Health data are missing for a
given week only if none of the respondents in the household were
available that week. Thus, health data are available for 93.2 percent
of all weeks. In the remaining 6.7 percent of the weeks, no respon-
dent was interviewed.
The financial data can be aggregated at the household level in a
particular week only if all respondents were present, which was
the case in 77.8 percent of potential weeks. To avoid dropping
the 15.4 percent of interview weeks in which household-level
health data are available and financial data are available for some
but not all respondents, we replace missing values in the financial
data by the respondent’s yearly average. We then aggregate the
financial data at the household level and include a dummy variable
indicating whether all respondents were interviewed in a particu-
lar week to control for imputation. This methodology applies to all
continuous financial outcome variables that were reported at the
individual level.13
3.2. Health insurance coverage and incidence of health shocks
A separate TCHP dataset provides information on monthly
enrollment, renewal, and suspension of insurance coverage. About
half of the sample, or 52.5 percent of households, was never
enrolled during data collection. A small fraction of households,
10.0 percent, was always enrolled in TCHP. Finally, 37.5 percent
was enrolled during some months but not during others. For this
last group, we observe within-household variation in insurance
status. Ten of these 45 households were not enrolled at baseline
but were enrolled later in the year, 16 were temporarily suspended
for one or more months due to failure to pay the monthly pre-
mium, and 19 households dropped out after being suspended or
after the redesign of TCHP.14 Section A.1 in the Online Supplement
summarizes our full baseline sample by insurance status. House-
holds who never utilize insurance differ systematically from house-
holds that do enroll, whereas such differences do not exist between
sometimes-insured and always-insured households.
We identify causal impacts of health insurance by observing the
effect of health shocks during weeks in which a household is
insured versus weeks in which the same household experiences a
health shock but does not have insurance coverage. Table 2 sum-
marizes the total number of weeks with health shocks (during
which at least one household member was reported to have expe-
rienced health symptoms) for the three types of households.
Households experience a health shock in 26.6 percent of weeks,
and the proportion of weeks with health shocks does not vary sig-
nificantly by household insurance status, meaning that we find lit-
tle evidence of adverse selection on health status.In one household, individual attrition occurred due to the death of the household
head. The remaining seven drop-outs were due to individuals leaving the household
for reasons not related to health.
12 This excludes 23 respondents who were interviewed fewer than ten times, mostly
because they were working (for example, in town) at the time of the interviews. We
drop these individuals from our analyses and attrition calculations.
13 In the analyses, which will be controlling for household fixed effects, we will
focus on variation in income or expenditures compared with a household’s yearly
average; absent respondents do not contribute to this variation because we imputed
the respondent’s yearly average if the respondent was not interviewed in a given
week.
14 Failure to pay the monthly premium was reportedly due to low levels of milk
production, resulting in failure to deduct the insurance premium from households’
monthly milk payments.
Table 2
Health shocks by insurance status.
Full sample Never insured Always insured Sometimes insured
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Week with health shock (%) 26.55 25.99 25.25 27.68
Week with health shock (#) 1518 769 148 601
Week with insurance coverage (%) 34.03 0 100.0 64.08
Week with insurance coverage (#) 1960 0 582 1378
Week with health shock and insurance coverage (%) 9.452 0 25.25 18.47
Week with health shock and insurance coverage (#) 548 0 148 400
Week with health shock but no insurance coverage (%) 17.10 25.99 0 9.203
Week with health shock but no insurance coverage (#) 970 769 0 201
Number of households 120 63 12 45
Total number of interviews 5747 3003 585 2159
Note: We focus on all health shocks for the analysis sample. The p-value of the test that the proportion of weeks with health shocks is different between the group ‘‘Never
insured” and ‘‘Always insured” is 0:912, between ‘‘Always insured” and ‘‘Sometimes insured” is 0:667, and between ‘‘Never insured” and ‘‘Sometimes insured” is 0:735. This
p-value is calculated based on a t-test for equal means.
16 We cannot directly compare the out-of-pocket health expenditures with the
actuarially fair premium rates for three reasons. First, for a large share of the sample,
expenditures were reported during periods with health insurance coverage, likely
reducing out-of-pocket health expenditures. In line with this, always-insured house-
holds report spending on average only 8.1 KSh per week, which is significantly less
than expenditures reported by never-insured or sometimes-insured households. In
contrast, compared with out-of-pocket expenditures for never-insured households,
actuarially fair premium rates for the (sometimes) insured may be higher due to
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health shocks in sometimes-insured households—or on average
13.4 health shocks per household. These households are insured
during 64.1 percent of all interview weeks, creating within-
household variation in whether health shocks occur during weeks
with or without insurance coverage. The effect of health insurance
is identified by comparing the response to 201 uninsured health
shocks versus 400 insured health shocks. We hence identify
impacts of health insurance using a relatively small number of
households but observed with a high frequency. We include house-
holds without variation in health insurance status in order to
improve precision in the estimates of the week fixed effects and
other covariates included in the analyses.15
3.3. Dependent variables
Table 3 describes the dependent variables used in the analyses,
by household insurance status. A first group of outcomes focuses
on health-seeking behavior and concomitant health expenditures.
Households visit a healthcare provider in 9.9 percent of all inter-
view weeks, mostly during weeks in which they report health
symptoms. We use a broad definition of a healthcare provider:
Patients can buy drugs from an unqualified drug vendor or shop-
keeper, go to a traditional healer, visit a qualified pharmacy for
drugs, or consult a healthcare professional at a clinic or hospital.
TCHP aimed to increase healthcare utilization in clinics or hospitals
(henceforth referred to as seeking care at a ‘‘facility”), which we
observe in 5.9 percent of all interview weeks, or 60 percent of all
weeks in which households visit a healthcare provider.
Average health expenditures—which include costs of consulta-
tion, drugs, laboratory tests, registration, and other items/proce-
dures, but not the amount paid by the insurance company,
transportation costs to the health provider, or health insurance
premiums—are KSh 20.5 per interview week, or about KSh 205
during weeks with a healthcare visit. Although we cannot directly
compare the out-of-pocket health expenditures with the actuari-
ally fair premium rates, we note that reported expenditures appear
low relative to the monthly insurance premium of KSh 300 for the15 If health shocks have different implications depending on whether a household
changes insurance status, i.e. whether or not it is a ‘switcher’ during the diaries
period, this strategy could bias the estimated effects of uninsured and insured health
shocks. Section A.8 of the Online Supplement therefore also estimates the effect of
health shocks separately for three groups of observations: households that are never
insured in the study year, households that are ever insured but not during the
observation week, and the same type of household observed in a week with health
insurance coverage. Results are qualitatively similar to those obtained below but are
estimated with lower precision due to our small sample size. We hence estimate Eq.
(1) as our preferred specification.basic package and even lower compared to the KSh 1100 that
households needed to pay for the comprehensive package.16
Our second set of analyses will test whether non-health expen-
ditures during weeks following health shocks are protected from
health shocks depending on whether the household has insurance
coverage. Total non-health expenditures (which exclude the health
insurance premium) are on average KSh 2322 per week. We disag-
gregate these into household food expenditures, household non-
food expenditures, and expenditures that the household incurs
for business or agriculture. Food expenditures are closely associ-
ated with food consumption, and households may prefer to smooth
food consumption rather than non-food expenditures. On average,
households spend KSh 378 per week on food, whereas they spend
on average KSh 917 per week on non-food items for the household
and KSh 1027 on business and agriculture.
In analyzing non-health expenditures, we will focus on impacts
during the weeks following a health shock. We focus on future as
opposed to current non-health expenditures in order to rule out a
bias due to state-contingent utility. For instance, illnesses and inju-
ries might reduce someone’s ability or preference to consume food,
reducing non-health expenditures even among the wealthiest
households. Expenditures in the subsequent week are confounded
less by such state contingencies and are more likely to capture the
extent to which households can smooth consumption despite hav-
ing to pay theirmedical bills or repay their loans for emergency care.
A final group of outcome variables relates to informal insurance.
First, we measure gifts and remittances received from family,
friends, neighbors, or other people in the household’s social net-
work in the week of the interview.17 Second, we measure the useadverse selection or to an increase in healthcare utilization induced by insurance
coverage. Finally, the program aimed at increasing the utilization of healthcare in
higher quality facilities, further increasing the actuarially fair premium rate above out-
of-pocket health expenditures, which also include payments to informal providers.
17 Informal transfers are reported as gifts and remittances. The number of instances
in which households report taking out (informal) loans is too small to include
informal credit as a dependent variable. However, we find that, controlling for
household and week fixed effects, receiving informal transfers during weeks with
health shocks is associated with a significant increase in the probability of sending
informal transfers in the next four weeks. This finding suggests that households
receiving these transfers return the money to the remitter at a later stage, thus
treating these self-reported gifts as informal loans.
Table 3
Dependent variables by insurance status.
Full sample Never insured Always insured Sometimes insured Comparison p-valuey
(2)–(3) (2)–(4) (3)–(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Week with health visit (%) 9.857 10.02 8.063 10.11 0.449 0.956 0.465
Week with health visit in facility (%) 5.851 5.599 4.833 6.476 0.609 0.353 0.367
Avg. health expenditure per week (KSh) 20.46 23.05 8.202 20.10 0.031 0.538 0.132
Avg. health expenditure in facility per week (KSh) 10.93 12.01 2.556 11.65 0.034 0.922 0.175
Avg. total non–health expenditures per week (KSh) 2322 2050 2196 2737 0.774 0.055 0.438
Avg. HH food expenditures per week (KSh) 377.8 353.9 366.6 414.1 0.769 0.043 0.371
Avg. HH non-food expenditures per week (KSh) 916.9 873.8 719.7 1030 0.513 0.324 0.269
Avg. business expenditures per week (KSh) 1027 822.2 1109 1293 0.447 0.068 0.702
Week with informal transfers (%) 10.63 10.12 12.41 10.87 0.604 0.785 0.751
Avg. informal transfers per week (KSh) 129.9 105.4 188.3 148.7 0.316 0.352 0.677
Week with saving withdrawals (%) 28.05 26.79 29.74 29.37 0.697 0.584 0.960
Avg. saving withdrawals per week (KSh) 692.4 546.0 507.7 946.6 0.856 0.033 0.230
Week with livestock or maize sale (%) 14.88 14.07 10.01 17.31 0.386 0.310 0.189
Avg. sales of livestock and maize per week (KSh) 575.4 513.2 343.5 724.2 0.464 0.294 0.338
Week with income from business or labor (%) 13.78 8.625 20.35 19.23 0.079 0.015 0.905
Avg. income from business or labor per week (KSh) 527.5 381.3 832.0 650.9 0.268 0.254 0.636
Number of observations 120 63 12 45
Total number of interviews 5747 3003 585 2159
Note: Never (always) insured households were not (always) insured during the diaries. Sometimes insured households changed their insurance status during the diaries.
y The p-value in Column (5)–(7) is calculated based on a t-test for equal means between these three different samples.
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maize, as informal self-insurance or consumption-smoothing mech-
anisms. Finally, we include income from business or labor as a
dependent variable, since households may work more hours in order
to raise more money to pay for their medical bills. Note that the
sometimes-insured households on average withdraw significantly
more savings and earn income from business or labor significantly
more often compared with never-insured households, but do not dif-
fer significantly from households that are always insured. House-
holds who never utilize insurance appear to differ systematically
from households that do enroll.
Fig. 1 presents these variables over time. Reporting of health
shocks is highest during the initial two months of the diaries
(toward the end of the hot late rains in 2012) and during May (dri-
ven by an increase in cold symptoms after the early rains in 2013)
with a lower incidence of health shocks in the drier, cooler season
between December and April. Health shocks appear to increase
again around August 2013, when the next late rains have started.
Insurance coverage reduces over time, and is not correlated with
seasonality in the incidence of health shocks, in contrast to vari-
ables to indicate visits of a healthcare provider and health expen-
ditures, especially in the early months. Finally, whereas food
expenditures remain relatively stable over time, we find a peak
in non-food expenditures and income during the weeks around
Christmas, as well as during the early rains around May. Seasonal
variation in expenditures is mainly driven by business expenses
and household non-food expenses. We include week fixed effects
in order to control for this seasonality in expenditures and health
shock patterns.
3.4. Mobile money usage as a proxy for access to informal insurance
We are interested in estimating the impacts of health insurance
on these dependent variables separately for households with more
versus less access to informal insurance. As a proxy for a house-
hold’s level of access to informal insurance, we use an indicator
for whether the household ever used mobile money to send or
receive money during the diaries year. On the one hand, mobile
money could provide households with easier access to remittances
and gifts during times of emergencies. On the other hand, house-
holds that were among the early adopters of mobile money aremost likely inherently different from the later adopters. For exam-
ple, they might be wealthier and hence have a greater capacity to
self-insure; they may also have a greater need for cheap, long-
distance financial transactions, e.g. from remitting relatives living
in town.
The study took place well before mobile money coverage
became near-universal in Kenya. As a result, only 55.8 percent of
study households used mobile money at some point during the
diaries period. The number of mobile money transactions was also
minimal, with 544 mobile money transactions recorded in total, of
which only 87 involved a gift or remittance received. It is hence
unlikely that our results will only reflect a direct effect of mobile
money technology; rather, the results indicate to what extent
healthcare utilization, health expenditures, and consumption
smoothing differ for households who have selected into the tech-
nology, in part because they have more access to informal insur-
ance than other households.
Table 4 describes household characteristics separately for users
and non-users of mobile money and tests for differences in means
between the two household types. In Panel A, we find that users
and non-users are fairly similar in terms of baseline characteristics,
with the exception of mobile phone ownership, which is larger
among mobile money users. In addition, we find no differences
in the average number of interviews per household.
Panel B describes differences in health shocks and insurance
status. Users and non-users of mobile money are equally likely to
be never insured during the diaries, to be always insured, or to
be sometimes insured. Users of mobile money are, however, signif-
icantly more likely to report health shocks compared with non-
users. This could indicate that users are either less healthy
(although we observed no differences in health-seeking behavior
at baseline) or more likely to self-report health shocks than non-
users of mobile money during the diaries period. We cannot rule
out either hypothesis, but note that the implication of this differ-
ence is that we observe more health shocks, and hence have more
power to find effects of health shocks and health insurance, for
users of mobile money.
Panel C describes our dependent variables for users versus non-
users of mobile money. Mobile money users are significantly more
likely to seek healthcare during the study period than non-users, in
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Fig. 1. Health shocks, health-seeking behavior and health expenditures by month.
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ities) when experiencing a health shock. As a result, mobile money
users spend more on health expenditures per week, although theydo not pay higher costs per health visit. In addition, mobile money
users have significantly higher non-health expenditures. The dif-
ference is mainly driven by a Ksh 58 difference in household food
Table 4
Baseline characteristics, health shocks, insurance and dependent variables by mobile money usage.
Full sample Nonuser of mobile money User of mobile money Comparison
Diff. p-valuey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Baseline characteristics
HH head age 51.72 51.49 51.90 0.405 0.888
HH head is male (%) 65.83 64.15 67.16 3.013 0.732
HH size 4.892 4.642 5.090 0.448 0.260
HH members under 18 years (%) 45.94 44.16 47.34 3.185 0.496
Adults not main breadwinner (%) 15.05 12.24 17.28 5.042 0.095
Head has completed primary school (%) 78.10 77.27 78.69 1.416 0.864
Head has completed secondary school (%) 44.76 40.91 47.54 6.632 0.505
Head engaged in business (%) 22.43 29.79 16.67 13.12 0.108
Number of mobile phones 1.850 1.642 2.015 0.373 0.046
Prop. of HH members with health visits 49.19 49.41 49.02 0.392 0.946
Number of health visits 8.908 7.962 9.657 1.694 0.351
Number of health visits for children 3.708 3.415 3.940 0.525 0.670
Number of health visits for adults 5.200 4.547 5.716 1.169 0.369
Panel B. Health shocks and insurance status during diaries
Week with health shocks (%) 26.55 18.98 32.54 13.55 0.000
Never insured (%) 52.50 54.72 50.75 3.971 0.669
Always insured (%) 10.00 9.434 10.45 1.014 0.856
Sometimes insured (%) 37.50 35.85 38.81 2.957 0.742
Panel C. Dependent variables
Week with health visit (%) 9.857 5.357 13.42 8.061 0.000
Week with health visit in facility (%) 5.851 3.637 7.603 3.966 0.000
Avg. health expenditure per week (KSh) 20.46 10.98 27.96 16.98 0.000
Avg. health expenditure in facility per week (KSh) 10.93 7.199 13.88 6.683 0.041
Avg. total non-health expenditures per week (KSh) 2322 1815 2723 907.6 0.007
Avg. HH food expenditures per week (KSh) 377.8 345.2 403.5 58.33 0.034
Avg. HH non-food expenditures per week (KSh) 916.9 597.1 1170 572.7 0.000
Avg. business expenditures per week (KSh) 1027 873.0 1150 276.6 0.257
Week with informal transfers (%) 10.63 4.072 15.82 11.75 0.000
Avg. informal transfers per week (KSh) 129.9 52.52 191.2 138.7 0.003
Week with saving withdrawals (%) 28.05 19.02 35.20 16.18 0.000
Avg. saving withdrawals per week (KSh) 692.4 382.0 937.9 555.9 0.001
Week with livestock or maize sale (%) 14.88 13.20 16.20 3.005 0.308
Avg. sales of livestock and maize per week (KSh) 575.4 408.9 707.0 298.2 0.103
Week with income from business or labor (%) 13.78 11.57 15.52 3.945 0.371
Avg. income from business or labor per week (KSh) 527.5 464.1 577.6 113.5 0.615
Number of households 120 53 67
Average number of interviews 47.89 47.47 48.22 0.752 0.407
Note: Users (nonusers) of mobile money reported at least one (no) financial transactions via mobile money during the diaries.
y The p-value in Column (5) is calculated based on a t-test for equal means between the sample of mobile money users and nonusers.
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expenditures, suggesting that mobile money users are richer com-
pared with non-users of mobile money.
Table 4 also shows that mobile money users on average have
increased access to informal insurance strategies. Most impor-
tantly, mobile money users receive informal transfers during 15.8
percent of all weeks, which is a significant 11.8 percentage points
higher compared to non-users. In addition, mobile money users
withdraw savings during 35.2 percent of all weeks, compared to
only 19.0 percent for non-users. This increases cash on hand among
mobile money users compared to non-users by on average KSh 139
per week from informal transfers and KSh 556 from savings.
Fig. 2 summarizes these averages for non-users and users of
mobile money during uninsured weeks, disaggregating the data
by weeks with and without a health shock. The incidence of a
health shock is associated with an increase in informal transfers
and sales of buffer stocks for mobile money users, but not for
non-users. Savings withdrawals and non-farm income instead
decrease for non-users of mobile money during weeks with an ill-
ness or injury, but not for users. These findings show systematic
differences in coping strategies between users and non-users of
mobile money, further validating our strategy to use mobile money
usage as a proxy for one’s ability to access informal insurance
during weeks with health shocks.4. Results
This section first describes the impacts of health insurance on
health care utilization and health expenditures during weeks with
health shocks and on non-health expenditures during the week
after a health shock. The analyses will distinguish between non-
users and users of mobile money. We hypothesize that health
insurance, which reduces out-of-pocket health expenditures, will
have positive impacts on healthcare utilization and consumption
smoothing for non-users of mobile money due to their weaker
access to alternative risk-coping mechanisms. For users of mobile
money, who have stronger access to informal coping mechanisms,
health insurance might crowd out informal insurance and hence
may have no impact on our main outcome variables. We test this
crowding-out hypothesis by studying the effect of health insurance
on informal coping behaviors. In the final part of this section, we
perform a number of robustness checks.4.1. Impacts of health insurance on healthcare utilization and
expenditures
Table 5 summarizes how households respond to health shocks
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Fig. 2. Response to health shocks during uninsured weeks by mobile money usage. Notes: This figure summarizes the average amounts in Kenyan Shillings (KSh) received as
gifts and remittances (informal transfers), withdrawn from savings, received by selling buffer stock assets (livestock and maize), and earned from business and labor, as
reported in the transactions dataset of the Health and Financial Diaries project (Janssens et al., 2013). We aggregate these variables at the household-week level by adding the
value of all transactions of a given type reported within seven days from the interview. We define non-users (users) of mobile money as households who report no (at least
one) transaction via mobile money. Weeks with (no) shocks are defined as weeks during which at least one (no) household member reports health symptoms. For households
in which some but not all household members were interviewed, we take the sum of all reported transactions without imputing a value for transaction values of respondents
who were not interviewed.
Table 5
Impacts of health insurance on healthseeking behavior, health expenditures, and non-health expenditures.
Health visit Health expenditures Non-health expenditures
(dummy variable) (inverse hyperbolic sine) (inverse hyperbolic sine)
Any Provider Facility Any Provider Facility Total HH food HH non-food Business
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nonusers of mobile money
Health shock * Uninsured 0.264⁄⁄⁄ 0.194⁄⁄⁄ 1.424⁄⁄⁄ 0.929⁄⁄⁄ 0.090 0.249⁄⁄ 0.026 0.178
(0.051) (0.041) (0.313) (0.246) (0.086) (0.104) (0.131) (0.168)
Health shock * Insured 0.283⁄⁄⁄ 0.199⁄⁄⁄ 0.884⁄⁄⁄ 0.432⁄⁄⁄ 0.112 0.117 0.147 0.076
(0.066) (0.061) (0.219) (0.153) (0.111) (0.136) (0.217) (0.133)
p-value Uninsured = Insured 0.814 0.947 0.147 0.079⁄ 0.130 0.029⁄⁄ 0.465 0.632
Users of mobile money
Health shock * Uninsured 0.354⁄⁄⁄ 0.185⁄⁄⁄ 1.684⁄⁄⁄ 0.870⁄⁄⁄ 0.043 0.034 0.110⁄ 0.022
(0.029) (0.019) (0.172) (0.127) (0.051) (0.062) (0.062) (0.093)
Health shock * Insured 0.393⁄⁄⁄ 0.266⁄⁄⁄ 1.263⁄⁄⁄ 0.691⁄⁄⁄ 0.112 0.066 0.087 0.179
(0.036) (0.031) (0.227) (0.166) (0.078) (0.154) (0.107) (0.156)
p-value Uninsured = Insured 0.384 0.018⁄⁄ 0.123 0.363 0.477 0.851 0.852 0.396
p-value Mobile money Uninsured 0.131 0.834 0.469 0.834 0.185 0.021⁄⁄ 0.348 0.294
p-value Mobile money Insured 0.148 0.324 0.232 0.252 0.999 0.803 0.807 0.210
Mean dependent variable (Nonuser) 0.052 0.035 0.240 0.137 1.407 0.994 1.130 1.042
Mean dependent variable (User) 0.135 0.077 0.728 0.253 1.395 0.895 1.146 1.091
R-squared within 0.255 0.149 0.159 0.099 0.333 0.065 0.194 0.057
Number of households 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Number of observations 5718 5718 5718 5718 5290 5290 5290 5290
Note: Coefficients are estimated using a linear model with household and week fixed effects, controlling for whether all respondents in the household are interviewed,
whether the household has insurance coverage interacted with mobile money users and nonusers, respectively. ‘‘p-value Uninsured = Insured” is the p-value from the test
that the two coefficients for ‘‘Health shock * Uninsured” and ‘‘Health shock * Insured” are equal. ‘‘p-value Mobile money Uninsured” is the p-value from the test that the two
coefficients of ‘‘Health shock⁄Uninsured” for mobile money nonusers and users are equal. ‘‘p-value Mobile money Insured” is the p-value from the test that the two
coefficients of ‘‘Health shock⁄Insured” for mobile money nonusers and users are equal.  p < 0:10  p < 0:05 p < 0:01.
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206 X. Geng et al. /World Development 111 (2018) 196–210estimates of b̂1 and b̂2 from Eq. (1), the effect of health shocks dur-
ing weeks without and with health insurance coverage, respec-
tively, for households that never report using mobile money in
the top panel and for households that do use mobile money in
the bottom panel. For both samples, we also report the p-value that
these two coefficients differ significantly from one another. We
further control for household and week fixed effects, insurance sta-
tus at the time of the observation estimated separately for non-
users and users of mobile money, and a dummy variable indicating
whether or not all respondents within the household were inter-
viewed, capturing the need to impute financial variables for an
absent respondent. For brevity, we do not report the fixed effects,
coefficients for insurance status ĉ j; j 2 fL;Mg, and the coefficient
for the dummy variable indicating respondent absence.
We first describe the results from the top panel for non-users of
mobile money. In Columns (1) and (2), we present estimates of Eq.
(1) for variables indicating whether the household consulted any
healthcare provider or a health facility, respectively. Not surpris-
ingly, household members are significantly more likely to seek
healthcare in weeks when they report health symptoms, both
without and with insurance coverage ðp < 0:01Þ. Nevertheless,
during uninsured weeks, only 26.4 percent consult any provider
when ill, including informal and traditional channels for healthcare
as well as pharmacies and facilities, and only 19.4 percent go to a
health facility. Health insurance does not appear to increase the
use of healthcare services, as indicated by the insignificant
p-value in the third row. Thus, households with weak access to
informal insurance forgo consulting with healthcare providers for
the majority of health shocks, regardless of their insurance status
when the symptoms occur.18
Columns (3) and (4) estimate Eq. (1) for out-of-pocket health
expenditures at any healthcare provider and in healthcare facili-
ties, respectively. In Column (3), health shocks increase total health
expenditures by 142 percent during weeks without insurance
ðp < 0:01Þ. During weeks with health insurance, these expendi-
tures increase by 88.4 percent ðp < 0:01Þ, which is nearly two-
thirds of the increase in the absence of insurance. The difference,
however, is not statistically significant ðp ¼ 0:147Þ. Column (4)
focuses on expenditures in facilities, which increase by 92.9 per-
cent during weeks with uninsured health shocks ðp < 0:01Þ. In
the presence of insurance coverage, these expenditures increase
by only 43.2 percent ðp < 0:01Þ, indicating that insurance provides
significant financial protection, although it does not fully cover all
out-of-pocket expenditures. The effect of TCHP on healthcare
expenditures in facilities is statistically significant ðp ¼ 0:079Þ.
Column (5) estimates the model for total non-health expendi-
tures in the following week, and Columns (6) to (8) disaggregate
these expenditures into household food expenditures, household
non-food expenditures, and business expenditures, respectively.
Uninsured health shocks do not significantly affect total expendi-
tures in the following week, independent of whether or not the
household has insurance coverage at the time of the health shock.
We do, however, observe a significant 24.9 percent reduction in
household food expenditures ðp < 0:10Þ. In contrast, the effect of
insured health shocks on food expenditures is positive and not sig-
nificantly different from zero. Thus, households without mobile
money can shield food consumption from health shocks only18 The health expenditures in Table 5 do not include travel expenses. Section A.2 in
the Online Supplement tests to what extent healthcare utilization is associated with
higher transportation costs, which could be a major barrier to seeking care since
clinics covered by TCHP can be far away. We find a significant increase in
expenditures on transportation for both non-users and users of mobile money,
especially in weeks when health shocks are covered by insurance, providing a
potential explanation for why we do not observe larger impacts on health-seeking
behavior.during periods with insurance coverage; in addition, the difference
in the response to uninsured versus insured health shocks is eco-
nomically sizable and statistically significant ðp ¼ 0:029Þ.
The bottom panel of Table 5 presents estimates b̂1 and b̂2 from
Eq. (1) for households who report using mobile money during the
period of data collection. We established in the previous section
that these households appear to have stronger access to informal
insurance, which could reduce the scope for health insurance to
have an impact. In fact, health insurance could even crowd out
the use of informal insurance strategies. We now test to what
extent this is the case.
For users of mobile money, health shocks induce significant and
meaningful increases in healthcare utilization and health expendi-
tures, as shown in Columns (1) to (4). In Column (1), health insur-
ance does not significantly affect healthcare utilization at any
provider ðp ¼ 0:384Þ, but in Column (2), health insurance increases
the utilization of facilities from 18.5 to 26.6 percent ðp ¼ 0:018Þ.
Health insurance reduces total out of pocket expenditures in Col-
umns (3) and (4), but not significantly so (p ¼ 0:123 and
p ¼ 0:363, respectively). This could be because even in TCHP facil-
ities, insured households might still pay a share of costs out-of-
pocket (for instance, for prescription drugs).
Despite the meaningful increases in healthcare utilization and
health expenditures, we find in Columns (5)–(7) that health shocks
do not significantly affect subsequent non-health expenditures,
including food expenditures and business expenditures, for unin-
sured households. Household non-food expenditures even increase
by a significant 11.0 percent ðp < 0:10Þ. In other words, households
with stronger access to informal insurance do not see a decrease in
their food consumption after a health shock occurs, even in unin-
sured weeks. Online Supplement Section A.3 shows that for mobile
money users, the increase in household non-food expenditures
during uninsured weeks is driven by increased spending on trans-
port and fuel ðp < 0:01Þ, and we also find increased spending on
labor to operate a business ðp < 0:10Þ. 19
It is worth reiterating that even in the absence of health shocks,
non-users of mobile money have on average lower household food
expenditures than users, as shown in Table 4. Their household food
expenditures are on average KSh 345 per week. A 24.9 percent
reduction in food expenditures implies that weekly food expendi-
tures fall by KSh 85.9, or around 1 US$, for households that are
spending only KSh 49 per day. Reductions in food consumption
will have large consequences at that level of subsistence. The effect
of uninsured health shocks is also substantial compared with the
limited variation in their food expenditures over time (see Fig. 1).
This means that protecting household expenses from health shocks
is important from a public policy perspective, particularly for
households with weak access to informal insurance mechanisms,
whose non-health expenditures are already at low levels even in
the absence of health shocks.
To summarize, non-users of mobile money reduce their food
and business expenditures following an uninsured health shock.
This reduction is related to increased health expenditures, suggest-
ing that these households cannot fully finance their medical
expenses through an inflow of informal transfers or other informalWe do not find evidence that increased non-health expenditures in the following
week are caused by postponed expenses in weeks with health shocks. In fact, when
using non-health expenditures in the current as opposed to the following week as the
dependent variable, we find an even larger and more significant effect of health
shocks on non-health expenditures. The finding that health shocks increase house-
holds’ non-health non-food expenditures is partially consistent with Wagstaff (2007),
who observed that households reallocate consumption away from food toward items
considered even more essential to the recovery of the sick member, such as expenses
on housing and electricity. Our results suggest that households with sufficient access
to informal insurance need not resort to such harmful strategies to finance their
higher expenditures on non-food items such as fuel or labor.
Table 6
Impacts of health insurance on potential informal risk-coping mechanisms.
Informal transfers Saving withdrawals Sales from buffer stock Business/labor income
Any Amount Any Amount Any Amount Any Amount
(dummy) (i.h.s.) (dummy) (i.h.s.) (dummy) (i.h.s.) (dummy) (i.h.s.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nonusers of mobile money
Health shock * Uninsured 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.127 0.014 0.117 0.032⁄ 0.232
(0.011) (0.079) (0.027) (0.197) (0.024) (0.188) (0.019) (0.142)
Health shock * Insured 0.032 0.208 0.035 0.207 0.061 0.622⁄ 0.024 0.189
(0.028) (0.253) (0.038) (0.236) (0.037) (0.332) (0.025) (0.201)
p-value Uninsured = Insured 0.282 0.444 0.217 0.221 0.106 0.066⁄ 0.077⁄ 0.083⁄
Users of mobile money
Health shock * Uninsured 0.054⁄⁄ 0.389⁄⁄ 0.008 0.054 0.032 0.307⁄ 0.013 0.130
(0.026) (0.175) (0.022) (0.194) (0.020) (0.172) (0.019) (0.161)
Health shock * Insured 0.064⁄⁄⁄ 0.369⁄⁄ 0.084⁄⁄ 0.622⁄⁄ 0.041 0.460⁄ 0.029 0.299
(0.023) (0.179) (0.035) (0.309) (0.028) (0.247) (0.023) (0.197)
p-value Uninsured = Insured 0.792 0.940 0.039⁄⁄ 0.083⁄ 0.801 0.603 0.585 0.486
p-value Mobile money Uninsured 0.054⁄ 0.039⁄⁄ 0.784 0.794 0.137 0.096⁄ 0.473 0.631
p-value Mobile money Insured 0.009⁄⁄⁄ 0.063⁄ 0.345 0.290 0.662 0.695 0.126 0.082⁄
Mean dependent variable (Nonuser) 0.041 0.055 0.190 0.205 0.125 0.218 0.116 0.259
Mean dependent variable (User) 0.160 0.144 0.356 0.441 0.154 0.225 0.156 0.277
R-squared within 0.039 0.036 0.046 0.040 0.095 0.087 0.046 0.023
Number of households 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Number of observations 5718 5718 5718 5718 5718 5718 5718 5718
Note: Coefficients are estimated using a linear model with household and week fixed effects, controlling for whether all respondents in the household are interviewed,
whether the household has insurance coverage interacted with mobile money users and nonusers, respectively. ‘‘p-value Uninsured = Insured” is the p-value from the test
that the two coefficients for ‘‘Health shock * Uninsured” and ‘‘Health shock * Insured” are equal. ‘‘p-value Mobile money Uninsured” is the p-value from the test that the two
coefficients of ‘‘Health shock * Uninsured” for mobile money nonusers and users are equal. ‘‘p-value Mobile money Insured” is the p-value from the test that the two
coefficients of ‘‘Health shock * Insured” for mobile money nonusers and users are equal. p < 0:10, p < 0:05, p < 0:01.
X. Geng et al. /World Development 111 (2018) 196–210 207coping strategies. Health insurance reduces their out-of-pocket
expenditures in clinics and hospitals, preventing a drop in their
food consumption and business expenses. However, insurance
coverage does not increase total healthcare utilization for this
group. For users of mobile money, an uninsured health shock
increases both medical and non-medical spending, but it does
not affect food expenditures. Health insurance increases formal
health care utilization for this group. The next section analyzes
whether health insurance crowds out informal strategies to cope
with financial emergencies.20
4.2. Effects of health insurance on informal coping strategies
Table 6 shows the impacts of uninsured versus insured health
shocks on four alternative informal coping strategies. The top panel
presents the estimated coefficients for non-users of mobile money.
Health shocks do not increase the probability of receiving an infor-
mal transfer, as shown in Column (1), or the amount of transfers
flowing into the household, as shown in Column (2), neither with
nor without insurance. Thus, for non-users of mobile money, for-
mal insurance does not crowd out informal transfers.
In Columns (3)–(4), an uninsured health shock does not signif-
icantly affect the probability of withdrawing savings, nor the
amount. We find a positive but statistically insignificant effect of
insured health shocks on savings withdrawals. In Columns (5)–
(6), we estimate a similar model for whether the household sells
livestock or maize, the two main non-cash commodities through
which households save in our study area. Uninsured health shocks
do not affect the probability of selling livestock or maize or the sale
value of livestock and maize, while insured health shocks increase20 Section A.9 in the Online Supplement describes estimates of the same model
using first differences instead of fixed effects. Results are fairly comparable to the
initial estimates using fixed effects, with a few exceptions. Because in the first-
difference estimator, we need to use the second instead of first lag of non-health
expenditures (since the first lag for this variable—non-health expenditures in the
week with the health shock—is most likely influenced by the shock as well), the fixed-
effects model is our preferred specification.income from selling these buffer stock assets by 62.2 percent
ðp < 0:10Þ.
Finally, in Columns (7)–(8), we analyze inflows of cash from
business and labor. During weeks following an uninsured health
shock, non-users of mobile money are 3.2 percentage points more
likely to earn money from business or labor ðp < 0:10Þ, increasing
their income by a sizable but statistically insignificant 23.2 per-
cent. We find no such effect for insured health shocks, and the
coefficients estimated for uninsured versus insured health shocks
are significantly different ðp < 0:10Þ.
In sum, for non-users of mobile money, we find no significant
effect of health shocks on informal transfers and cash savings.
We do, however, observe an effect of uninsured health shocks on
labor supply. Insurance appears to crowd out this effect, while
crowding in income from selling livestock and maize. Although
speculative, this could be related to insured households’ need to
travel to TCHP facilities further away, which might require higher
travel expenses and perhaps the loss of a day of work. To cover
these costs, households might decide to sell small livestock or
maize in storage.
The bottom panel suggests that TCHP does not have a crowding-
out effect for users of mobile money. For these households, unin-
sured health shocks increase the probability of receiving an infor-
mal transfer by 5.4 percentage points in Column (1) and the
average amount received by 38.9 percent in Column (2), which
are both significant at the 5-percent level. Insured health shocks
increase the probability of receiving transfers by a comparable
6.4 percentage points, and average transfer amounts received
increase by a similar order of magnitude as those for uninsured
shocks. Note that the informal transfers are not used to bridge a
gap between out-of-pocket payments at the clinic and later reim-
bursement by the insurance scheme, because TCHP operates a
cashless system with immediate coverage at network facilities.
During uninsured weeks, we further find that uninsured health
shocks increase income from selling buffer stock assets by 30.7
percent ðp < 0:10Þ. During weeks with insured shocks, we find in
addition a significant increase in the amount of savings withdrawn,
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from business or labor. This provides further indications that insur-
ance does not crowd out—but rather crowds in—private healthcare
financing.
In Section A.6 of the Online Supplement, we distinguish
between gifts from residents of the same village versus friends or
family outside the community. We find that even when focusing
on gifts from inside the community, non-users of mobile money
have weaker access to informal transfers than users. Mobile money
users cope with health shocks mainly by using within-community
gifts and rely on remittances from outside the village only in cases
of more severe shocks. Health insurance crowds out these remit-
tances, which could reflect the costs associated with either asking
for a transfer or sending it from afar.
In sum, non-users of mobile money—as suggested by our non-
parametric results in Section 3 and Fig. 2—hardly resort to informal
coping strategies when facing uninsured health shocks, with the
exception of slightly increasing their income from business and
labor. Insurance weakens this response in labor supply, instead
crowding in the use of buffer stock savings as an informal coping
strategy. Mobile money users, on the other hand, rely on informal
transfers and sales of maize and livestock to finance their unin-
sured health expenditures, as well as their additional expenditures
on transportation, fuel, and labor to operate their businesses.
Health insurance does not crowd out informal transfers and
appears to crowd in the use of cash and buffer stock savings to
finance these expenditures.4.3. Heterogeneity by health shock type
In Section A.4 of the Online Supplement, we further show that
findings are very comparable when focusing only on ‘severe’ health
shocks that prevent ill household members from carrying out their
daily activities for at least one day. This implies that our results are
driven not only by severe health shocks but also by minor ail-
ments—which account for more than one-third of all health
shocks—that would have gone unreported in surveys with longer
recall periods. Such mild health shocks might not affect people’s
ability to carry out daily tasks, but they do have a direct impact
on households’ health and non-health expenditures and thus
should be accounted for.
Section A.5 of the Online Supplement also distinguishes
between illnesses affecting the breadwinner in the household ver-
sus children. When the breadwinner in a non-user household falls
ill, we observe a strongly negative effect on food expenditures, but
only when the household is uninsured. Uninsured health shocks
among children, on the other hand, do not affect household food
consumption. These health shocks are associated with increased
business or labor income, suggesting that breadwinners increase
their labor efforts to cover children’s medical expenses. Insurance
reduces medical costs substantially when children are involved.
In contrast, for households that use mobile money, health shocks
do not harm food expenditures and might even increase food
expenditures when the breadwinner is ill.5. Discussion and conclusion
Health shocks can have long-lasting, financially catastrophic
consequences for households without access to reliable insurance
mechanisms. This paper evaluates the impact of health insurance
on health-seeking behavior and consumption smoothing depend-
ing on whether households use informal insurance mechanisms
as a health financing strategy. We also test whether health insur-
ance crowds out such informal mechanisms. Crowding out of infor-
mal insurance would generate positive impacts for importantoutcomes such as poor households’ wealth accumulation and for
their friends and family receiving fewer requests for financial aid
(Strupat & Klohn, 2018). Crowding out of these private sources of
health financing could however also limit the impacts of health
insurance schemes that aim to increase total (pre-paid) health
spending in developing countries (Gaag & Stimac, 2012).
We study the impacts of health insurance using high-frequency,
high-detail panel data on health, health-seeking behavior, and
households’ cash flows, collected in the context of a community
health insurance scheme in Kenya. Variation in households’
monthly insurance status allows us to study how the same house-
hold copes with health shocks in weeks with and without health
insurance coverage. The high-frequency data allow us to investi-
gate not only major health shocks that prevent household mem-
bers from carrying out their daily activities, but also less severe
health symptoms that can easily be overlooked in a household sur-
vey with a longer recall period. Finally, we analyze coping strate-
gies separately for non-users and users of mobile money,
conjecturing and validating that these households structurally dif-
fer in their access to informal risk-coping strategies.
We find that for non-users of mobile money, health shocks sig-
nificantly reduce food expenditures. Consistent with our conjec-
ture, these households do not rely on informal strategies to
finance their health expenditures; for these households, health
insurance cushions the negative impacts of health shocks on food
consumption by lowering out-of-pocket health expenditures at
formal facilities. Despite this reduction in health expenditures,
we do not observe an increase in these households’ healthcare uti-
lization during weeks with health insurance coverage. In contrast,
for users of mobile money, uninsured health shocks do not affect
food consumption. These households appear to finance their health
expenditures by selling buffer stock assets and by attracting more
gifts and remittances in weeks with health shocks. Nevertheless,
health insurance is not a mere substitute for informal strategies;
rather, it increases the probability that these households will seek
high-quality care at a formal healthcare facility, and it does not
reduce income from informal insurance mechanisms, except for
longer-distance remittances in case of severe health shocks. This
suggests that while informal risk-coping strategies and health
insurance are substitutes in terms of consumption smoothing, they
are complements in terms of healthcare utilization.
It is important to stress that mobile money users’ improved
ability to cope with health shocks (in the absence of health insur-
ance) is not caused by the improved ease of receiving remittances
through mobile money. The study was conducted in a period when
mobile money coverage was not yet near-universal in Kenya, and
most gifts and remittances were received in cash instead of wired
via mobile money. Hence, mobile money as a technology is unli-
kely to drive our results. Rather, usage of the technology seems
to be a proxy for households’ access to informal insurance, such
as greater access to cash and buffer stock savings or to gifts and
remittances from their social network.
Our findings imply that health insurance can provide value to
different households in different ways and that mobile money
usage, which is increasingly common across many developing
countries, can help distinguish between these different house-
holds. Even in areas or periods with higher mobile money penetra-
tion and more complex usage patterns compared to what we found
in the present study (where only 50 percent of households
reported using mobile money at least once during the year), one
could use machine learning to predict households’ ability to cope
with health shocks and the impacts of health insurance on the
basis of mobile money usage patterns. A promising question for
future research is whether this approach indeed works; if it does,
such an approach would help policymakers identify households
with different healthcare needs.
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users of mobile money’—has a relatively smaller social network
and lower savings to cope with health shocks. Because they do
not rely on informal mechanisms, non-users would strongly bene-
fit from the financial protection that health insurance can provide.
As such, governments and donors would want to target insurance
premium subsidies toward this most vulnerable group. Conditional
on household access, mobile technologies can help reduce the costs
of providing such subsidies, and because insurance earmarks the
money for healthcare, this could help attract donations from gov-
ernments, donor organizations, or even individuals interested in
financing healthcare for the poor.
By contrast, the second group—the ‘users of mobile money’—is
able to cope with health shocks through an increase in informal
transfers from friends and family. This group might benefit from
health insurance by inducing households to seek better quality
healthcare from clinics and hospitals instead of from pharmacists,
informal drug vendors, or traditional healers. Recall that health
insurance lowers remittances received from outside the commu-
nity, partly because migrant family members invest considerable
resources in monitoring the household’s finances (De Laat, 2014).
The need for such monitoring would arguably diminish if family
members residing elsewhere had the opportunity to pay the health
insurance premium directly on the non-migrant household’s
behalf.
To conclude, we find that health insurance empowers vulnera-
ble households to pre-pay for affordable, high-quality health care,
without crowding out private sources of health financing.
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